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Devo ir ao tribunal? O papel do Judiciário nas 
disputas entre pecuaristas e a indústria frigorífica no 
Brasil
A pesquisa apresentada neste artigo tem por principal objetivo 
analisar o papel do Judiciário na solução de conflitos entre os pe­
cuaristas e a indústria frigorífica no Brasil. Para tanto, investiga-se 
a aquisição de gado para abate no estado de Mato Grosso do Sul 
(Centro-Oeste do Brasil), em três etapas. Inicialmente, descreve-se 
o padrão da transação entre os pecuaristas e a indústria frigorífica, 
identificando um vácuo de garantias ao longo da cadeia de supri­
mentos. Em sequência, apresentam-se evidências de que esse vácuo 
de garantias pode dar margem a conflitos legais de não pagamento, 
o que, de fato, é a questão prevalente no Judiciário. Finalmente, 
investiga-se o papel do Judiciário para solucionar esses conflitos. 
Os resultados sugerem que, em média, os produtores têm baixa 
confiança no sistema legal, indicando um papel potencial que 
mecanismos informais desempenham nesse sistema agroindustrial. 
Conclui-se com sugestões de estratégias públicas e privadas.
Palavras-chave: instituições, judiciário, garantias, carne bovina.
1. INTRODUCTION
At the end of the 1990s, the Brazilian meatpacking industry went through a 
huge expansion process. During this period, the largest Brazilian meatpackers 
issued shares in the stock market, internationalized their activities and diversified 
their business by incorporating other activities beyond slaughtering and beef 
processing(1). In 2008, due to a severe economic crisis, part of the meatpacking 
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industry collapsed. Because they were highly leveraged and 
with a significant portion of their debts listed in U.S. dollars, 
many Brazilian meatpackers went bankrupt, and the majority 
of cattle raisers failed to get paid for animals delivered to the 
slaughterhouses. 
The problem of non-payment in the meatpacking industry, 
however, is not new. The 2008 crisis aside, the history of 
fraudulent bankruptcy in the meatpacking industry is always 
vivid in the memory of economic agents that operate within the 
Brazilian beef industry (CALEMAN, 2010). The relationship 
between cattle raisers and meatpackers in Brazil is thus charac­
terized by a traditional rivalry. In regard to spot market trans­
actions, the main conflict concerns the producer’s risk of not 
receiving payment for the animals sold to the slaughterhouse. 
Accordingly, the lack of guarantees for the supply of cattle for 
slaughter is a latent problem in the agribusiness sector in Brazil. 
The bankruptcy of meatpackers generates a mass of farmers 
who become creditors and may eventually go to court in order 
to get paid for the animals delivered to the slaughterhouse. In 
this regard, the judiciary may once again play a major role in 
reducing transaction costs in the agribusiness sector.
The main objective of this perspective paper is to analyze 
the role of the judiciary in resolving conflicts between cattle 
raisers and meatpacking firms. Looking at the transaction for 
the acquisition of cattle for slaughter in the state of Mato Grosso 
do Sul (Central-Western region of Brazil)(2), the present study 
focuses on the role of formal institutions (i.e., the courts) in 
resolving conflicts in the beef agribusiness system. The analysis 
encompasses three steps. First, the authors describe the transac­
tion pattern between cattle raisers and meatpacking firms, iden­
tifying a guarantee vacuum within the supply chain. Second, 
the authors present evidence that the guarantee vacuum may 
give rise to legal conflicts of non-payment, which are indeed 
prevalent in disputes that reach the courts. Finally, the role of 
the judiciary in resolving these conflicts is investigated. Results 
suggest that, on average, producers have low confidence in the 
legal system, indicating the potential function that informal 
mechanisms may play in the supply chain. 
The paper is structured as follows: 1. Introduction; 2. The­
oretical background; 3. Description of the transaction pattern; 
4. Assessment of legal disputes; 5. Econometric evidence; and 
6. Conclusions.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
This research focuses on the role of the judiciary in solving 
a problem of economic inefficiency in the transaction between 
cattle raisers and meatpackers. The authors claim that the insti­
tutional economic analysis (COASE, 1937; WILLIAMSON, 
1985; NORTH, 1991; WILLIAMSON, 1996; BARZEL, 1997) 
offers a theoretical basis for addressing this problem. Accord­
ing to the institutional approach, institutions matter and the 
judiciary plays an important role.
Coase (1937) was one of the first authors to investigate the 
importance of institutions. He fundamentally argues that there 
are costs involved in operating in the market, called “transaction 
costs”. Williamson (1985) further operationalizes these ideas, 
noting that transaction costs may occur both ex ante – including 
the costs of drafting, negotiating, and establishing contractual 
safeguards – and ex post – encompassing the costs of contract­
ual adjustment, the costs related to governance structures, and 
those associated with disputes that potentially arise after the 
signing of any agreement. As a general principle, the efficiency 
of economic relations is related to the reduction of transaction 
costs (WILLIAMSON, 1996).
Williamson (1985) also suggests an analytical scheme made 
of three levels: individuals, organizations, and institutions. In 
the scheme, individuals represent the base level, indicating the 
fundamental influence derived from behavioral characteristics 
(e.g., bounded rationality). Organizations, the middle level, 
may be restricted by or take advantage of opportunities arising 
from their interactions with institutions and individuals. The 
institutional environment represents the top level. Institutions 
not only determine the rules under which business will be 
conducted, but also induce the agents to adapt and seek new 
forms of interaction.
Especially in regard to the institutional environment, 
North (1991) defines it as a system of informal and formal 
rules that have an effect on the process of transferring prop­
erty rights. Informal rules are implicit constraints within 
a particular culture which can be derived from customs or 
codes of conduct. Formal constraints, on the other hand, are 
compulsory rules made explicit by some legitimate power 
with the purpose of maintaining order and the development 
of a society. Formal rules interfere with the way transactions 
are carried out because they create incentives or transaction 
costs for organizations. 
An important, adjunct dimension of formal rules is the func­
tioning of the judicial system. It has been long argued that the 
development of societies is strongly connected to the existence 
of active, stable judicial systems (SHERWOOD, SHEPHERD, 
and SOUZA, 1994; YEUNG, 2010). Barzel (1997, p.98), for 
instance, claims that
“the courts participate in rights delineation in two 
ways. The first is indirect: when the parties choose 
to settle their disputes without resorting to the courts, 
their actions are influenced by their perceptions of 
how the courts would have acted in their dispute. 
The second is direct: the disputes are actually settled 
by the courts”. 
It bears emphasizing that Barzel’s argument is founded on 
the notion that the courts do work in an effective way. Dixit 
(2004, p.3), however, notes that the legal system may be dys­
functional in many countries. In India, for instance, one can 
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find 25 million cases pending before the courts (Bearak, 2000). 
In Russia, observers note that the enforcement of the verdicts 
of the courts is problematic, mainly for smaller enterprises 
(HAY and SHLEIFER, 1998; HENDLEY, MURRELL, and 
RYTERMAN, 2001). Similar situations are reported in East­
ern Europe and in Vietnam (McMILLAN and WOODRUFF, 
1999; 2000). 
In Brazil, studies prepared by the World Bank highlight 
a number of weaknesses in the national judicial system(3). 
Yeung and Azevedo (2009) also identify different problems in 
the Brazilian judiciary; the authors argue that the flaws in the 
judicial system have historical, cultural, political, structural, and 
legal origins(4). According to Yeung and Azevedo (2009), the 
difficulties observed in the Brazilian judicial system become 
more evident because of the high number of cases pending 
before the courts, and the high volume of cases designated to 
each judge (an average of 10,000 per judge). These factors, 
in conjunction with the numerous possibilities of appealing a 
judicial decision, contribute to a perverse result: the average 
time for judgment of a case in Brazil ranges from 1,000 to 
1,500 days. Beyond the traditional factors used to explain the 
inefficiency of the judicial system – lack of financial and human 
resources, as well as inadequate criminal procedure – Yeung and 
Azevedo (2009) call attention to the inefficient management of 
the “judicial machine” and the organizational culture supported 
by an entrenched bureaucracy.
A second line of analysis seeks a better comprehension of 
the judge’s decision-making process, investigating the con­
nection between the judge’s behavior and the efficiency of the 
judicial system. According to Arida, Bacha, and Lara-Rezende 
(2005), for instance, Brazilian judges tend to favor the weak­
er party in a legal dispute as a way to promote some sort of 
social justice. Ferrão and Ribeiro (2006), in turn, examine the 
behavior of Brazilian judges in 181 cases and test the concept 
of jurisdictional uncertainty, defined as the bias of the judge 
against the creditors, rendering difficult the application of the 
guarantees in a specific transaction. 
Rezende and Zylbersztajn (2012) analyze judicial decisions 
in the context of contractual breaches occurring in the forward 
sales contracts of soybeans in the Midwest region of Brazil in 
the early 2000s. Considering the impact of judicial decisions on 
firms’ strategy, Rezende and Zylberzstajn (2012) find evidence 
that court decisions led to a 44% reduction in the number of 
forward sales contracts of soybeans in the region, as well as a 
reduction in other types of contractual arrangements. From a 
similar perspective, Zylbersztajn and Nadalini (2007) analyze 
the decision of a tomato processing company to move from 
the Northwest region of Brazil to the Midwest region due to 
local producers’ high frequency of contractual breaches. Zyl­
bersztajn and Nadalini (2007) find evidence showing that the 
company’s decision was based on the inability of the local court 
to guarantee the enforcement of contractual clauses agreed by 
the parties involved in the transaction.
In its entirety, the evidence discussed above poses questions 
about the effective capacity of the Brazilian judiciary in resolv­
ing conflicts that emerge in the agribusiness sector. Taking into 
account this issue, and with specific reference to the conflict in 
the production of beef, section 3 of the present paper examines 
the transaction pattern between cattle raisers and meatpacking 
firms in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, Brazil. Quite sur­
prisingly, the authors identify a guarantee vacuum within the 
supply chain, which may involve recourse to the legal system 
as described in section 4. In section 5, the authors investigate 
the degree of farmers’ confidence in the judiciary.
3. THE SUPPLY OF CATTLE TO THE  
 MEATPACKING INDUSTRY IN BRAZIL
The present paper investigates the transaction carried out 
between cattle raisers and meatpacking firms in the spot market 
in Brazil(5). In the majority of Brazilian states, the price to be 
paid to cattle raisers is measured in 15-kilogram increments(6). 
The price is related to animals’ dead weight, being a function of 
the “carcass yield”. The carcass yield is the ratio between the 
weight of the live animal to be slaughtered and the weight of its 
carcass (flesh and bones, measured after slaughter) in percent­
age. The farmer is typically paid based on the carcass yield(7).
In general, cattle for slaughter are traded through direct sales 
or brokers. In the case of direct sales, it is common for the cattle 
raiser to come in contact with meatpacking employees to get 
information on prices and to negotiate the amount of animals 
to be slaughtered as well as the payment terms. The payment 
for animals may occur “in sight” or within 30 days. After the 
meatpacking bankruptcy in 2008, spot prices are usually paid 
within 2 to 3 days after the slaughtering and this usually includes 
a discounted rate of 3% to 5%, depending on previous negoti­
ations. In the case of deferred payment, the farmer receives a 
Rural Promissory Note (RPN) as collateral security. After the 
negotiation, the animal is loaded at the farm. Transportation is 
typically performed by the meatpacking firm’s own truck or 
by private contractors (i.e., a carrier) hired by the meatpacker. 
Meatpacking firms can also outsource the purchasing of 
animals to independent brokers. In some situations the brokers 
not only mediate the purchase of livestock, but also escort the 
shipment and watch over the animal slaughter. There are four 
types of intermediation.
•	 The broker may be a buyer’s representative with an ex­
clusive relationship with the meatpacking firm. Under this 
arrangement, the broker’s commission is typically paid by 
the company.
•	 Alternatively, the broker may work as an independent pro­
fessional who represents different meatpacking companies. 
In this case, the cattle raiser trusts the broker as they usually 
have a long-term relationship. The broker brings information 
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on market conditions and may eventually supervise the ani­
mal slaughtering process. The commission of independent 
brokers is typically paid by cattle raisers themselves. In this 
case, the intermediation occurs without guaranteeing the 
effective transaction – i.e., the broker does not guarantee the 
payment of the animal sold, nor the carcass yield.
•	 Animal intermediation may also involve some type of gua­
rantee. The broker may ensure part of the transaction (e.g., 
the carcass yield) or the whole transaction (e.g., payment in 
advance). In the case of guaranteeing carcass yield, the broker 
assumes the risk of variation in the carcass performance when 
comparing the animal’s weight at the farm and at the slaugh-
terhouse. The broker assumes a portion of the risk because 
he is paid only if the carcass yield at the slaughterhouse is 
higher than at the farm.
	 In the case of guaranteeing the whole transaction, the broker 
advances payment to cattle raisers based on the animal weigh-
ting at the farm and sells the animal to the slaughterhouse. 
The broker’s remuneration consists of the positive price 
difference between buying and selling the animals. This 
type of intermediation is usually performed by specialized 
brokerage firms, and is not very common as it involves the 
total risk of the transaction.
•	 Finally, the broker may work as a dealer (marchand), buy - 
ing animals from cattle raisers, slaughtering them in an out­
sourced manufacturing plant, and selling the meat to retail. 
Figure 1 illustrates the main types of intermediation. The 
dashed arrows represent the cash flow and the solid arrows 
represent the product flow. Although formal data about the share 
of each type of intermediation is not available, one can say that 
the most common type is intermediation without guarantee.
The description above suggests that one important dimen­
sion regarding the analysis of the supply of cattle for slaughter 
is the guarantee pattern of the transaction. As noted, the pay­
ment to cattle raisers may occur “in sight”, made within 2 to 
3 days after the slaughtering, or it may be “deferred”. In the 
case of deferred payment – which is generally made 30 days 
after the animals’ slaughter – the slaughterhouse issues a Rural 
Promissory Note (RPN) on behalf of the farmer in order to 
guarantee the payment. The RPN provides a collateral security, 
being usually signed and guaranteed by an employee of the 
commercial department of the firm(8). Following the established 
schedule, the company makes the payment directly into the 
farmers’ bank account. 
In case the producer needs to advance the payment, he or 
she may discount the RPN at an accredited bank. There are two 
types of discount: RPN supported by Law decree Nº 167/1967 
and RPN discounted in the secondary market, i.e. without for­
mal legal support. The discount supported by the Law decree is 
under the bank’s responsibility. In the case of secondary market 
discount, the bank usually sets a tying operation to discount the 
RPN. Actually, it is a personal credit transaction backed by the 
RPN; in this situation, responsibility rests with the producer 
and not with the RPN issuer. This method is called discount	in	
parallel and in this operation the risk is borne by the producer.
Regardless of the type of payment (in sight or deferred), 
one may note that cattle raisers face a lack of guarantees in 
their business operations. Producers deliver the animals to 
slaughterhouses without receiving accurate information about 
expected returns. The carcass yield and the amount owed by 
the slaughterhouse will be defined only after the slaughter and 
the carcass evaluation. It is only at this stage that producers 
may receive a formal document, the Rural Promissory Note, 
which qualifies them as a creditor of the company. One can 
then identify a time lapse between the delivery of the animal 
to the slaughterhouse and the notification of the amount that 
will be paid to the cattle raiser. This time lapse is equivalent 
to a guarantee vacuum within the Beef Chain.
As a general result, the guarantee vacuum lies at the heart 
of the conflicts between cattle raisers and meatpacking firms. 
From a theoretical point of view, such a situation emerges as a 
paradox, being inherently unstable because the lack of guaran­
tee may give room to opportunistic behavior (WILLIAMSON, 
1996). Accordingly, if transactions are recurrent in the supply 
chain, one may expect the emergence of some type of organiz-
ational solution. The authors are particularly interested in the 
role of the judiciary as a solution to the guarantee vacuum in 
beef production. By settling disputes and mitigating the mag­
nitude of transaction costs, the courts are expected to reduce 
the negative impact associated with the lack of guarantees in 
the supply chain. In order to further investigate this subject, the 
next section examines the pattern of conflicts brought before 
the courts by cattle raisers.
4. LEGAL DISPUTES: AN OVERVIEW
As suggested in section 3, the conflict between cattle raisers 
and meatpacking firms is more acute in the case of direct sale 
and intermediation with no guarantees. In either case, farmers 
are at risk of not receiving payment from the meatpacker. If this 
does occur, the farmer may file a lawsuit against the meatpacker. 
In the present paper, the examination of legal disputes is 
based on a survey of lawsuits filed in the Court of Justice of 
the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, from November, 2002 to 
December, 2010. The survey was developed with the explicit 
purpose of identifying the conflict pattern that brings cattle 
producers and meatpacking companies to court. 
As shown in Table 1, there were a total of 50 trials at the 
Court during the period analyzed. The highest number of court 
trials occurred in 2003, when 11 cases were brought before the 
court. The data also reveals that the main reason for conflict 
between cattle raisers and slaughterhouses involves the claim 
of non-payment for animals sold to slaughter. In effect, 78% 
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of the legal claims are related to the general situation in which 
the producer does not receive payment of the animal sold for 
the slaughterhouse. Therefore, the lack of guarantees emerges 
as an underlying source of conflict within the meat production 
industry in the state(9). 
In the case of non-payment for the animals, the authors 
examined the allegations underlying this litigation (Table 2). 
Based on judges’ notes in each case, the predominant reason 
for the non-payment is the bankruptcy or the evidence of po­
tential bankruptcy of the meatpacking firm, which represents 
48% of the total legal claims(10). Another important cause of 
conflict (30%) is the debt payment made to a third party who 
has not been formally accredited as a creditor, such as cattle 
auctioneers or cattle brokers. 
It is interesting to note that bankruptcy in the meatpacking 
industry may be related to a fraudulent initiative. According to 
a legal statement filed by the State General Attorney(11) there 
exist complex ownership relations among different slaugh­
terhouses, featuring a practice by which the legal title of the 
meatpacking firm (de jure property) does not correspond to 
Figure 1: The Mode of Supply of Cattle to Meatpacking Firms
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actual possession (de facto property). Under this practice, it 
becomes difficult to penalize the company and, in the case of 
bankruptcy, the creditors may be prevented from recovering 
the debts. The explanation is that the de jure owner is usually 
a person with low income, without any property to give as a 
guarantee to the transaction. If this is the case, the producer may 
Table 1
Lawsuits Brought to Court (Cattle Raisers and Meatpackers): Mato Grosso do Sul, 2002 – 2010
Legal Claim 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Producers request the bankruptcy of  
the meatpacker 4 4
Meatpacker claims that animals were 
not delivered according to specifications 
agreed between the parties
1 1
Producers request a revision on the 
discount applied to contract price 1 1 2
Disputes between the parties on the 
amount paid 1 3 4
Farmers claim non-payment of the 
animals delivered to the meatpacker 4 6 3 5 5 7 4 5 39
Total 4 11 4 5 1 5 7 5 8 50
Source: Court of Justice of Mato Grosso do Sul/Brazil – Elaborated by the authors.
Table 2
Legal Claims Brought to Court Under the Claim of Non-Payment of the Animals Delivered to the Meatpacker
Description 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Disputes about formal aspects of 
documents and the guarantor liability 1 1 1 1 2 6
Producers request the attachment of a 
property as collateral for payment 3 1 4
Payment was made to a 3rd person 
who is not accredited by the creditor/
farmer
1 2 3 2 3 1 3 15
Producers request the blocking of beef 
stock 1 1
Producers request property 
confiscation 3 1 1 3 8
Company is under bankruptcy 1 1 1 3
Questions about responsibility of 
outsourcing slaughter 1 1
Questions about payment prescription 1 1
Total 4 6 3 5 - 5 7 4 5 39
Source: Court of Justice of Mato Grosso do Sul/Brazil – Elaborated by the authors.
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not receive any financial settlement even if the judge confirms 
the producer’s right to receive the debt.
In hypothetical terms, the farmer could go to a local Board 
of Trade to see who is listed as owner of the slaughterhouse. The 
farmer could also find out, before making a transaction, whether 
the listed owner is fully able to pay their financial commitments. 
In practice, however, there are costs to gathering information 
and costs to verifying information (COASE, 1937). The farmer 
may eventually resort to a Producer Association, asking that 
it perform this task. Associations, however, reportedly oppose 
performing this kind of task, considering it beyond their pur­
view. In any case, the existence of such fraudulent practice 
sheds light on the lack of formal requirements to authorize the 
operation of slaughterhouses(12).
As indicated in Table 2, there seems to be an important 
relationship between the number of lawsuits in court and the 
occurrence of bankruptcy. In line with this evidence, Table 3 
shows that a total of 11 meatpacking companies in Mato Grosso 
do Sul went bankrupt, asked for bankruptcy protection, or were 
under judicial recovery between 2003 and 2010. 
So far, we know that the relationship between cattle raisers 
and slaughterhouses is characterized by a guarantee vacuum. 
The evidence presented in this section also suggests that such 
a situation may give rise to legal conflicts of non-payment, 
which are prevalent in disputes that reach the courts. Taking 
into account the perspective of the cattle raiser, the next section 
investigates the role of the judiciary in resolving these conflicts. 
Specifically, we present a quantitative analysis whose purpose 
is to examine the producers’ confidence in the judiciary and the 
role of the courts in arbitrating conflicts over non-payment for 
cattle sold for slaughter.
5. CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY
This empirical section starts with a description of the survey 
which serves as a basis for the examination of the producers’ 
confidence in the judiciary regarding the solution of conflicts 
over non-payment for cattle sold to slaughter. The data was 
collected through 107 questionnaires in March, 2010 in the 
state of Mato Grosso do Sul. This is a non-probabilistic sam­
ple since part of it is characterized as a self-generated sample 
(52% of the questionnaires). The random component of the 
sample (48% of the questionnaires) consists of farmers from a 
list of producers that sold animals for slaughter during January 
and February, 2010. The list was made available by the State 
Bureau of Animal and Plant Health Protection (IAGRO/MS). 
The interviews were conducted with the farmers in charge of 
making decisions about the animal trade(13).
Table 4 summarizes the profile of the interviewed producers. 
More than half of the respondents have a college degree, have 
Table 3
Meatpackers Under Bankruptcy or Insolvency, Mato Grosso do Sul
Meatpacking Firms Status Year Municipality/MS
Frigorífico Pedra Bonita Ltda. Bankruptcy protection 2003 Itaporã
Frigorífico Ponta Porá Ltda. Bankruptcy 2003 Ponta Porã
Torlim Produtos Alimentícios Ltda. 
Verge of bankruptcy, 
but currently in 
operation
2008
Amambaí
Itaporã
Frigorífico Bonifácio Ltda./Frigorífico Boi Verde 
Alimentos Ltda./ Frigorífico Boi do Centro Oeste (*)
Bankruptcy in 
industrial plants lease Rio Verde
Frigorífico Garantia Plant closing 2008 Amambaí
Campo Oeste Carne Indústria, Com., Imp. e Exp. Ltda. Bankruptcy 2008 Campo Grande
Frigorífico Margem Ltda. Judicial recovery 2008 Paranaíba/ Três Lagoas/ Coxim
Frigoestrela S.A Judicial recovery 2008 Ribas do Rio Pardo
Independência Alimentos S.A Judicial recovery 2009 Nova Andradina/ Anastácio/Campo Grande
Frialto Judicial recovery 2010 Iguatemi
Fribrasil Alimentos Ltda. Judicial recovery 2010 Caarapó/Eldorado
Notes: (*) Case 2007.006092-8/0001.00 (April, 16th, 2007) presents a full description of the fraudulent relationship between three meatpacking firms (Frigorífico Bonifácio Ltda., 
 Frigorífico Boi Verde Alimentos Ltda. and Frigorífico Boi do Centro Oeste) where owners make use of partners to cover up tax debts and commit acts which can potentially 
 harm farmers.
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worked in cattle production for over 20 years, and present a 
strong income dependence on the cattle production. In regard 
to technical conditions, the average cattle production presents 
an intermediary technological level as made evident by slaugh­
tered steers between 20 and 36 months of age, the use of feed 
supplementation in the dry season, and the use of artificial 
insemination for breeding animals.
The pattern of conflicts in the transaction between producers 
and the meatpacking firms is presented in Table 5. More than 
half of the interviewed producers reported problems of not 
being paid for the animals sold to slaughterhouses, and of these, 
nearly half reported that the problem occurred more than once. 
It is noteworthy that among those respondents who reported 
problems of non-payment, less than half turned to the courts 
as a way to ascertain their rights, and less than 20% of these 
said that the judicial mechanisms were effective to solve the 
problem. Overall, 63% of respondents say they have little 
confidence in legal justice. 
According to the producers, the main reasons for the lack 
of confidence are(14): the inefficiency of justice (70%), mainly 
represented by the length of the process (i.e., the possibility of 
appealing repeatedly in order to “gain time”) and the existence 
of legal loopholes that delay the judges’ final decision; the be­
lief that current legislation does not prioritize the payment of 
cattle suppliers (52.3%)(15); lack of enforcement of the court’s 
decisions (51.4%); the existence of legal but not de facto share­
holders (33.64%); and attorneys’ fees (15.88%). 
The low level of enforcement of the courts’ decisions could 
be associated with the producers’ perception that the slaughter­
house cannot afford the debt because the legal shareholder of 
the firm is not de facto. Thus, he or she might lack the necessary 
equity to ensure the debt. Converging with the perception that 
the law is weakly enforced and the lack of equity guarantees, 
producers argue that the standards and criteria for granting 
operating licenses for new slaughter plants in the State of Mato 
Groso do Sul are not effective in ensuring the working capital 
necessary to operate the businesses.
Besides the reasons listed above, other explanations cited 
by producers are bureaucracy, slaughterhouses’ lack of equity 
to honor payments, and the possibility of having more effective 
Table 4
Respondents’ Profile
Number of 
Producers %
Number of 
Producers %
Time in Cattle Production Activity Level of Education
1 to 10 years 11 10.3 Basic education 17 16.2
11 to 20 years 26 24.3 High School 15 14.3
21 to 30 years 40 37.4 College (or more) 73 69.5
More than 30 years 30 28.0
Family Tradition in Cattle Production Production Capacity (Slaughter/Year)
1rst generation 22 20.5 Less than 500 35 34.0
2nd generation 37 34.6 501 to 2,000 46 44.7
3 rd generation 22 20.6 2,001 to 5,000 14 13.6
4 rd generation or more 26 24.3 More than 5,000 8 7.7
Percentage of Income from Cattle Production Production Technology
Less than 50% 17 16.0 Pasture 48 45.3
51% to 99% 24 22.6 Supplementation (dry season) 35 34.0
100% 65 61.4 Feed lot 22 20.7
Slaughter Age Use of Artificial Insemination
Up to 20 months 1 1.0 Yes 53 50
20 to 36 months 78 73.6 No 53 50
More than 36 months 27 25.4
Source: Research survey.
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Table 5
Pattern of Conflicts
Number of 
Producers %
Number of 
Producers %
Level of Confidence in Justice Non-Payment Historical?
High 12 11.21 Yes 64 59.81
Average 27 25.23 No 43 40.19
Low 68 63.55
Number of Times / Non-Payment Last Non-Payment 
Once 35 54.69 < 5 years 31 48.44
2 times 11 17.19 5 to 10 years 14 21.88
3 times 12 18.75 > 10 years 19 29.69
> 3 times 6 9.38
Judicial Mechanisms? Is the Judicial Mechanism Effective?
Yes 30 46.88 Yes 5 15.63
No 34 53.13 No 27 84.38
Source: Research survey.
extra-judicial agreements (less costly). In sum, all the reasons 
perceived by the producers illustrate the inefficiency of for­
mal institutions (Brazilian Courts) to guarantee cattle raisers’ 
property rights.
Considering the results above and seeking further evidence, 
the authors perform a logit estimation. The econometric anal­
ysis is conducted based on three main hypotheses: the lack of 
confidence in legal justice is enhanced in the presence of past 
conflicts (H1), in the recurrence of non-payment events (H2), 
and in the presence of recent defaulting (H3). Table 6 shows the 
variables included in the econometric model, their relationship 
with the research hypotheses and the expected sign. 
In the estimation of the logit model, the dependent variable 
takes two values: 0 in case of the producers’ lack of confidence 
in legal justice and 1 for a large amount of confidence in legal 
justice. The regression also encompasses control variables: 
elements of scale (number of properties and slaughter capacity) 
and the producer’s education level (college degree). The results 
are presented in the Table 7.
The regression result suggests that non-payment for the cat­
tle sold to slaughterhouses is the fundamental factor in shaping 
the producers’ confidence in the judiciary. In a broader sense, 
this result suggests that non-payment itself can be interpreted by 
farmers as evidence that the legal system operates in a limited 
way as a mitigating element of breach of contract. If formal 
institutions do not take the form of an omnipresent threat that 
automatically prevents the occurrence of non-payment, they 
may also fail in providing legal protection once the non-pay­
ment has effectively occurred.
It is worth noting that the above argument does not mean 
that the issue of guarantee vacuum in the transaction between 
cattle raisers and meatpacking firms is not addressed by the 
parties in the transaction. As previously noted, since trans­
action costs are positive and the relationship in the supply 
chain is recurrent in time, the parties may develop some 
kind of organ izational arrangement. The regression analysis 
suggests that in combination with the protection granted by 
the courts, the parties may base their actions on some kind of 
informal – social – mechanisms (OSTROM, 1990; ZENGER, 
LAZZARINI, and POPPO, 2001; NEE and SWEDBERG, 
2005). Accordingly, informal mechanisms may play a major 
role in beef production. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the role of the 
judiciary in resolving conflicts between cattle raisers and meat­
packing firms. Looking at the transaction for the acquisition 
of cattle for slaughter in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, this 
essay focuses on the role of formal institutions in the resolution 
of conflicts in the beef agribusiness system.
The analysis encompasses three basic steps. First, the au­
thors describe the transaction pattern between cattle raisers and 
meatpacking firms, identifying a guarantee vacuum within the 
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supply chain. The authors then present evidence that the gua - 
ra ntee vacuum may give rise to legal conflicts of non-payment, 
which are indeed prevalent in disputes that reach the courts. 
Finally, the role of the judiciary to resolve these conflicts is 
investigated, taking the perspective of the cattle raiser as a 
reference point. Results suggest that, on average, producers 
have little confidence in the courts, pointing to the potential 
role that informal mechanisms may play in the supply chain.
In more general terms, the understanding of the pattern 
of conflicts surrounding cattle raisers and the meatpacking 
industry is of major importance for improving beef agribusiness 
efficiency. To this end, this study investigates the role of the 
judiciary in addressing the problem of the lack of guarantees 
in commercial transactions, helping to unfold a source of in­
efficiency in this productive sector in Brazil. Producers’ lack 
of confidence in legal mechanisms should be considered when 
developing public and private strategies. 
In terms of public policies, the authors argue that the role 
of the state is to strengthen the legal mechanisms, emphasizing 
the legal aspects (legislation) and the regulation of the sector. 
Potential actions encompass:
•	 Re-classification of claims in bankruptcy law – Brazilian 
bankruptcy law does not prioritize farmers (suppliers of raw 
materials). Even though cattle raisers represent the largest 
group of creditors, they are not necessarily the group with 
the highest amount owed. Because they represent a class 
of creditors with little bargaining power, cattle raisers are 
disadvantaged in the negotiation of the judicial recovery 
plan. The relevance of farmers for the future viability of the 
slaughterhouse, however, might justify the change in credit 
rating, giving them the necessary creditor priority.
•	 Revision of standards and criteria for the granting of ope­
rating licenses for new meatpacking plants – as argued 
in this paper, it is common in the beef agribusiness that 
industrial units be leased off by companies that do not have 
sufficient financial resources to ensure the operation of the 
plant (working capital). In some cases, even the ownership 
structure of these companies is questionable. Thus, the state 
should be aware of the need for greater regulation of the 
sector, establishing more stringent criteria for the granting 
of operating licenses for new businesses.
•	 Regarding private strategies, the organization of cattle 
raisers in producer associations may represent an important 
alternative in filling the gap of guarantees that characterizes 
the relationship between cattle raisers and the meatpacking 
industry. The strengthening of collective actions could even 
induce the adoption of advance payment for the cattle deli-
vered for slaughter. Besides this specific advantage, the 
building of bargaining power is of major importance for 
cattle raisers as a way of overcoming the guarantee vacuum 
in transactions with the meatpacking industry.
Table 6
Econometric Variable Descriptions and Research Hypotheses
Variable Description Detailed Hypothesis Variable Type Sign
Level of Confidence in Justice (high/ low). Dependable variable Dummy
[problem] The producer has faced a problem of 
non-payment for the cattle sold to slaughterhouses.
H1 – The lack of confidence in legal justice is  
         enhanced by the presence of past  
         conflicts.
Dummy -
[probl_jud] The producer has had problem of not 
being paid for the animal sold to slaughter and has 
gone to Court.
Dummy -
[probl_jud-sol] The producer has had problem of 
not being paid for the animal sold to slaughter; has 
gone to Court and had the problem solved.
Dummy +
[probl_vez] The number of times the non-payment 
occurred.
H2 – The lack of confidence in legal justice is  
         positively related to the recurrence of  
         non-payment events (frequency).
Continuous -
[probl_temp] The last time the non-payment 
occurred.
H3 – The lack of confidence in legal justice is  
         enhanced in the presence of recent default  
         events (path dependence).
Continuous +
Source: Research survey.
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Table 7
Producers’ Confidence in Legal Justice
Dependable Variable Confidence in Legal Justice (0 = low; 1 = high)
[standard error in brackets] Model [1] Model [2] Model [3] Model [4] Model [5]
Prob_vez
0.1 0.1    
[0.17] [0.17]    
Probl_temp
0 0 0.04 0.05 0.05
[0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Probl_jud
-0.57 -0.63 -0.03 0.09 0.08
[0.56] [0.58] [0.56] [0.59] [0.59]
Probl_jud_sol
 0.44 0.45 0.55 0.6
 [0.98] [0.98] [1.006] [1.01]
Problem
  -1.02 -1.16 -1.15
  [0.57]* [0.59]* [0.60]*
Number of properties
   -0.1 -0.1
   [0.17] [0.17]
Slaughter capacity
   0 0
   [0.00] [0.00]
College degree
    -0.18
    [0.49]
Constant
-0.52 -0.52 -0.13 0.07 0.177
[0.28]* [0.27]* [0.30] [0.43] [0.52]
Log likelihood -69.63 -69.53 -68.03 -64.44 -64.37
LR chi2   1.11 1.31 4.31 5.62 5.75
Prob > chi2   0.77 0.86 0.36 0.46 0.57
Pseudo R2    0.0079 0.0093 0.0307 0.0418 0.0428
Note: * 10% significance level.
Source: Research survey.
(1) JBS Friboi, the leading Brazilian beef company, 
is a sound example. The JBS Group operates in 
the segments of beef, pork, lamb, and poultry. It 
is also involved in dairy production and the market-
ing of leather, cans, collagen, biofuels, and veg - 
etables.
 
(2) Mato Grosso do Sul is a state located in the Midwest 
of Brazil which is of great importance to Brazilian 
beef production and exportation.
 
(3) Technical Document nº 319/1996 – “O Setor Judi-
ciário na América Latina e no Caribe – Elementos 
para reforma” [The Judicial Sector in Latin Ame­
rica and the Caribbean – Elements for reform]; 
Report nº 19/1997 – “O Estado em Transformação” 
[The State Transformation]; and Report nº 24/2002 
– “Instituições para os mercados” [Institutions for 
markets]. Available at: <www.worldbank.org>. 
 
(4) Yeung (2010) presents a detailed analysis of the 
role of the judicial system and the quality of the 
judicial system in Brazil. Seeking inspiration 
from Sherwood, Shepherd, and Souza (1994), and 
Hammergren (2006), Yeung (2010) identifies and 
discusses six relevant factors for the construction 
of an ideal judicial system: guaranteed access; 
independence; non-biased decision-making pro­
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cess; predictability; celerity; and adaptation to and 
promotion of private activities
 
(5) This study does not investigate transactions 
involving quality contracts in which specific 
investments are made.
 
(6) 15 kilograms of cattle is called arroba.
 
(7) The producer is not paid for the viscera, leather, and 
other products of slaughter. The average carcass 
yield is 50%.
 
(8) The employee does not assume legal liability.
 
(9) Considering that the transaction pattern in the beef 
chain is virtually the same throughout the country, 
the same result may be expected in the Brazilian 
beef sector as a whole.
 
(10) There are 24 lawsuits of non-payment that are 
related to the problem of bankruptcy (according 
to these litigations, farmers go to court claiming 
non-payment as a means of protection against the 
potential for the meatpackers` bankruptcy). Yet 
another 15 lawsuits, which totalized 39 events of 
non-payment, are not related to the problem of 
bankruptcy but to the fact that a 3rd person not 
accredited by the farmers received the payment for 
the cattle sold to the slaughterhouse on their behalf. 
 
(11) Legal Procedures Nº 2007.006092-8/0001.00 and 
Nº 2003.012226-5 – <www.tjms.jus.br>.
 
(12) Entrepreneurs interested in establishing a slaugh-
terhouse in Mato Grosso do Sul need to issue sani­
tary and environmental certificates and register the 
company with the Board of Trade. The State Decree 
Nº 12.056, March 8th 2006, provides a general tax 
treatment to beef cattle operations, and investors 
interested in larger tax exemptions may ask for 
a specific agreement. In general, entrepreneurs 
request tax exemptions under agreement terms for 
which it is necessary to present an Economic and 
Financial viability analysis to the State Government. 
The Government also requests a set of certificates 
that prove the suitability of shareholders and a 
statement of income of each partner. The minimum 
equity capital required to constitute the firm does 
not need to comply with specific regulations. In the 
case of funding, the sponsoring institution estab- 
lishes the equity capital according to the investment. 
However, in the case of renting a slaughterhouse and 
not asking for tax exemptions, the Government only 
requires the social contract, a simplified certificate 
from the Board of Trade, and the leasing contact. 
There is no need to present any certificate to prove 
the suitability of the shareholders or the economic 
viability. The last situation poses the greatest chal­
lenge in the prevention of the phenomenon of legal 
but not de facto shareholder. 
 
(13) The questionnaires were performed preferably by 
phone (67.29%) or through personal interviews 
(27.10%). Some interviews were conducted via 
e-mail (5.61%).
 
(14) The frequencies of responses do not total 100% be­
cause many respondents identified more than a single 
reason for their lack of confidence in the courts.
 
(15) Regarding the problem of not prioritizing produc-
ers in case of bankruptcy litigation, the Brazilian 
Law of Bankruptcy (Law Nº 11.101, February 9th, 
2005) recognizes farmers as unsecured creditors. 
Specifically, considering the classification of claims 
under Brazilian law (Law Nº 10.406, January 10th, 
2002), labor claims, secured credits, tax credits, 
and credits with special and general privilege have 
priority over the unsecured debts.
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Should I go to court? An assessment of the role of the Judiciary in disputes between cattle 
raisers and meatpackers in Brazil
The main objective of this perspective paper is to analyze the role of the judiciary in resolving conflicts between 
cattle raisers and meatpacking firms in Brazil. Looking at the transaction for the acquisition of cattle for slaughter in 
the state of Mato Grosso do Sul (the central-western region of Brazil), the analysis encompasses three steps. First, 
the authors describe the transaction pattern between cattle raisers and meatpacking firms, identifying a guarantee 
vacuum within the supply chain. Secondly, the authors present evidence that the guarantee vacuum may give rise to 
legal conflicts of non-payment, which are indeed prevalent in disputes that reach the courts. Finally, the role of the 
judiciary in resolving these conflicts is investigated. Results suggest that, on average, producers have little confidence 
in the legal system, indicating the potential function that informal mechanisms may play in the supply chain. The 
paper concludes by suggesting some implications for public and private strategies.
Keywords: institutions, judicial system, guarantees, beef chain. 
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¿Debo ir a la corte? El papel del poder judicial en los conflictos entre ganaderos y la industria 
frigorífica en Brasil
El principal objetivo en este estudio es examinar el papel del poder judicial en la resolución de conflictos entre ga­
naderos y la industria frigorífica en Brasil. Para ello, se investiga la compra de ganado para matadero en el estado de 
Mato Grosso do Sul (centro oeste de Brasil) en tres etapas. Inicialmente, se describe el patrón de las transacciones 
entre los ganaderos y la industria frigorífica, lo que permite identificar un vacío de garantías a lo largo de la cadena 
de suministro. A continuación, se presentan evidencias de que dicho vacío de garantías puede dar lugar a conflictos 
legales relativos a falta de pago, lo que es, efectivamente, el tema predominante en el poder judicial. Finalmente, se 
investiga el papel del poder judicial en la resolución de dichos conflictos. Los resultados sugieren que los productores 
tienen, en general, poca confianza en el sistema legal, lo que indica un posible papel que mecanismos informales 
juegan en este sistema agroindustrial. Se concluye el estudio con sugerencias de estrategias públicas y privadas.
Palabras clave:	instituciones, sistema judicial, garantías, carne vacuna.
R
ES
U
M
EN
